Since gaining independence, Kenya has generally adhered to a policy of non-interference in the internal conflicts of other nations, particularly those revolving around struggles for self-determination.
This is evident in its limited involvement in the fight against apartheid in South Africa, the coups and countercoups in Uganda, and Operation Turquoise—the Kagame-led effort that ended the Rwandan genocide.
Sudan, however, is a striking exception. Kenya has repeatedly intervened in Sudanese affairs, both in the former Sudan (1956–2011) and the current Sudan (post-South Sudan’s secession), often catalysing regional pushes for self-determination. But why, and to what end? From a historical and strategic perspective, President William Ruto’s recent actions in Sudan appear to be a misstep.
Sudan’s civil conflicts stem largely from colonial rule under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1956), established following the Berlin Conference of 1884. This administration divided Sudan into two regions: the Arab-Muslim-dominated North and the South, populated by African tribal communities and heavily influenced by Christian missionaries. Though Sudan achieved independence in 1956, this North-South division fueled tensions that erupted into civil wars.
The First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) broke out soon after independence, with the South demanding autonomy due to political marginalization by the Arab-Muslim elite in Khartoum. During this period, Kenya’s first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, motivated by a commitment to liberation struggles, subtly supported South Sudan’s self-determination.
He permitted Israeli planes to refuel in Nairobi after delivering arms to southern bases and held private meetings with Southern Sudanese leaders. While Kenya avoided overt support for the rebels, its contributions helped facilitate the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the war.
Peace proved temporary, and eleven years later, the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) emerged due to the collapse of the earlier accord. Fought between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), it lasted over two decades and ranks among the longest civil wars in history.
Under Presidents Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, Kenya’s involvement shifted toward economic and strategic interests. An autonomous South Sudan was seen as a potential market for Kenyan goods, a source of exploitable mineral wealth, and a key partner in the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project.
Kenya supported the SPLM by granting political asylum to its leaders, including Dr. John Garang de Mabior (SPLM founder), Salva Kiir Mayardit, and Nhial Deng Nhial, allowing them to operate from Nairobi for diplomatic and organizational purposes.
Using its international influence, Kenya rallied global support for the SPLM’s cause, advocating for South Sudan’s self-determination while keeping the war’s humanitarian toll in focus. Kenya’s mediation was pivotal in securing the 2002 Machakos Protocol, which granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the conflict and paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011.
South Sudan’s secession was expected to resolve Sudan’s decades of strife, but instability persisted. In 2019, mass protests ousted Sudan’s longtime ruler, Omar al-Bashir.
A civilian-military transitional government formed but was overthrown in October 2021 by a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. In April 2023, a new civil war erupted between al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.” Once allies, these factions turned rivals in a brutal power struggle.
Kenya, now under President William Ruto, has once again become entangled in Sudan’s conflict. Though Ruto publicly calls for dialogue between the SAF and RSF, his actions suggest a clear tilt toward the RSF.
In early January 2024, he hosted Hemedti at State House in Nairobi. Late in 2023, Ruto traveled to Juba with RSF Deputy Commander Abdulrahim Dagalo—Hemedti’s brother, who faces U.S. sanctions for allegedly fueling Sudan’s war. More recently, Kenya welcomed another RSF leader in Nairobi, reinforcing perceptions of alignment. While SAF leader General al-Burhan visited Nairobi on November 13, 2023, Ruto’s pattern of engagement heavily favors the RSF.
Ruto’s predecessors engaged Sudan with diplomatic subtlety and strategic foresight, balancing mediation with Kenya’s interests. Kenyatta supported liberation discreetly, while Moi and Kibaki leveraged economic opportunities without compromising Kenya’s neutrality.
Ruto’s open alignment with the RSF, however, departs from this tradition. This risks undermining Kenya’s reputation as a neutral leader in peacekeeping—a status earned through restraint in other regional conflicts. Should the RSF lose, Kenya could face alienation from Sudan’s future leadership, damaging diplomatic relations, trade, and security cooperation.
Compounding this miscalculation is a lack of domestic support. Unlike Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki, Ruto has not secured broad public backing for his Sudan policy. Many Kenyans remain unclear about the motivations behind Kenya’s deep involvement or why Ruto supports the RSF—a faction that, like the SAF, has been accused of civilian atrocities. If Kenya’s engagement is truly in the national interest, Ruto must clarify his strategic objectives.
Kenya’s diplomatic efforts should prioritize its people and state, focusing on economic opportunities, regional stability, and geopolitical leverage.
Ruto must recalibrate his approach, restoring Kenya’s role as a respected, neutral mediator rather than a partisan player in Sudan’s conflict. Without transparency and a return to diplomatic tact, Kenya risks not only its international standing but also its long-term interests in a volatile region.
