Kenya’s politics, like politics anywhere in the world, has seen the formation of alliances that have achieved their intentions: capturing power. Some of these alliances, however, have been politically impotent.
Take, for instance, the G7 Alliance; a political coalition formed around 2010-2011 by a group of influential leaders opposed to then-Prime Minister Raila Odinga ahead of the 2013 General Election.
Or consider the One Kenya Alliance, composed of Kalonzo Musyoka, Gideon Moi, Moses Wetangula, and Musalia Mudavadi, in the run-up to the 2022 election. Both alliances, in the end, were like fireworks: loud, colorful but quickly fading into the night.
Now, with the newly formed alliance between Ruto’s UDA and Raila’s ODM, I can’t help but wonder about the long-term viability of this union leading into the 2027 elections. The alliance came too early, like a couple rushing into marriage before they’ve even had their first argument.
Several great political philosophers and strategists have warned against forming alliances too early, arguing that premature coalitions can weaken one’s influence, limit strategic options, or even lead to betrayal; a political “game of thrones,” if you will, but with fewer dragons and more backstabbing.
And as history has shown, premature alliances often end up like a cake that was taken out of the oven too soon — all fluff on the outside but raw in the middle. The very idea of this alliance working seems to me like trying to force a square peg into a round hole.
Ruto and Raila, both seasoned political players, may soon discover that their alliance, once seen as a beacon of unity, could collapse under the weight of ambition, ego, and the inevitable quest for power. So, while this early union may seem like the magic solution to Kenya’s political landscape, after reflecting on Niccolò Machiavelli, San Tsu. Julius Caesar and Otto von Bismarck, I’m inclined to think that this alliance will fizzle out before we even get to the 2027 elections, as explained.
Niccolò Machiavelli an Italian diplomat, philosopher, historian, and political strategist in The Prince, offers a timeless political insight, cautioning leaders against forming alliances without clear advantages.
He advises, “A wise prince should never join another powerful ruler to attack a third unless it is necessary. For if the ally wins, you become his prisoner; if he loses, you perish with him.” This warning holds profound relevance when we examine the nascent alliance between Ruto’s UDA and Raila’s ODM, a coalition with questionable long-term strategic benefits.
The Ruto-Raila alliance presents a web of uncertainties. For instance, who is supporting whom in 2027? Can Raila reasonably expect to become Ruto’s deputy? And if so, what becomes of leaders like Wetangula and Musalia Mudavadi, whose political ambitions are already well-defined?
If Raila chooses to back Ruto in 2027, can he truly count on the loyalty of his voting bloc, especially when we recall how, in the 2022 elections, Central Kenya overwhelmingly rejected Raila in favor of Ruto, despite Uhuru’s endorsement? Can political support be inherited, or is it a fleeting commodity, vulnerable to the whims of an electorate that is anything but predictable?
Machiavelli’s caution against overreliance on others for power is particularly poignant here. It’s clear that Raila has been the stabilizing force in the Kenya Kwanza administration, especially after the Gen Z protests and the impeachment of Hon. Rigathi Gachagua. However, one must question, for how long?
Raila, fully aware of his pivotal role, may soon see this as leverage to demand more, potentially overstretching his hand. Such a move could lead to a fallout that might leave the alliance fractured, mirroring past political betrayals.
This raises the real possibility of Raila pulling a move similar to what he did in 2002 when, recognizing that KANU was a sinking vessel, he jumped ship at the right moment. If history teaches us anything, it’s those political alliances, especially those formed out of convenience rather than conviction, are fragile.
So, while the Ruto-Raila alliance may appear solid now, we must ask whether it will endure the test of time—or whether it, like its predecessors, will crumble under the weight of ambition, personal interests, and Machiavellian strategy.
Secondly, Sun Tzu, ancient Chinese military strategist and philosopher, in The Art of War, emphasizes the importance of patience in strategy, warning against forming unnecessary alliances that could limit flexibility. He famously states, “Do not ally with others unless you have clear advantages,” highlighting that alliances should only be formed when they are strategically necessary and beneficial.
Premature coalitions can weaken a leader’s position, create dependence, and force them into conflicts they didn’t anticipate. The Ruto-Raila alliance exemplifies this, as it fueled Ruto’s arrogance toward Rigathi Gachagua, directly leading to his impeachment. It was the ODM MPs, with instructions from Raila, who tipped the scales for Riggy G’s downfall, creating a dependence on Raila that could dissolve at any moment.
Sun Tzu further warns, “To rely on rustics and not prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues.” This cautions against trusting alliances blindly and stresses the importance of self-reliance.
Ruto, having formed an alliance too early, risks being unprepared for any future betrayal or shift in the political landscape. The question now is: where does this leave Musalia and Wetangula, key allies for Ruto in Western Kenya? With ODM’s overbearing influence, this alliance is likely to undermine their position, especially as figures like CS Oparanya and Senator Osotsi are positioned for greater power.
Moreover, what happens to ambitious politicians like Babu Owino and Tim Wanyonyi? In the 2022 Azimio agreement, Nairobi was zoned for Jubilee candidates, sidelining Wanyonyi. Now, with Ruto’s alignment with Raila, the power dynamics in Nairobi are shifting, and Babu Owino’s aspirations for the gubernatorial seat are increasingly uncertain.
Even Governor Sakaja, elected under UDA, is seen as aligning closely with Raila, with Raila even hinting at supporting him. This further alienates those uncomfortable with the alliance, pushing them toward the opposition to build their own political bases.
Lastly, Sun Tzu says, “The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” The premature Ruto-Raila alliance risks forcing Ruto to follow Raila’s agenda, abandoning his own strategic goals.
Ruto has shifted away from his Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda and his hustler narrative, no longer speaking about digital jobs, planting 10 million trees, or his ambitious industrial park projects. Instead, he has adopted Raila’s “inclusivity” narrative, revealing his dependency on Raila and exposing his weaknesses. This alliance may have turned Ruto into a follower rather than a leader, shaping his destiny.
Otto von Bismarck; a German statesman and diplomat who unified Germany and served as its first Chancellor from 1871 to 1890, a master of Realpolitik (practical politics driven by strategic necessity
rather than ideology or emotion.) famously said, “Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best.” His approach was marked by carefully timed alliances, avoiding entanglements that could weaken his position. By playing powers against each other, he ensured that Germany remained dominant. This strategic caution is a lesson that seems to have been overlooked in the Ruto-Raila alliance.
The Ruto-Raila alliance places Ruto in a precarious position of trust. Should this alliance falter, Ruto risks being seen as the common denominator of failure. His past alliances with Gachagua and Uhuru Kenyatta, both of which ended in tension and betrayal, have already tainted his reputation.
If the Ruto-Raila coalition collapses, no other Kenyan politician may be willing to partner with him. He will likely be viewed as the problem, rather than the solution, making future alliances more difficult to secure. In true Bismarckian fashion, Ruto should have been more cautious, ensuring that any partnership was carefully timed and strategically beneficial, rather than rushing into an alliance that could ultimately undermine his position.
Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) a Roman general, statesman, and dictator whose military conquests and political manoeuvres transformed the Roman Republic, paving the way for the Roman Empire is a prime example of the impermanence of political alliances.
Initially, he formed the First Triumvirate with Pompey and Crassus, but as he consolidated power, he realized that alliances are often temporary and can become a burden rather than a source of strength. He famously stated, “If you must break the law, do it to seize power; in all other cases, observe it.” Caesar understood that political survival sometimes requires decisive action, even if it means breaking away from alliances that no longer serve one’s interests.
In the case of the Ruto-Raila alliance, this could very well mirror the trajectory of the First Triumvirate. The alliance, formed out of convenience, risks becoming a hindrance to Ruto rather than a strengthening force. Already, the political base of William Ruto has been shaken.
Original UDA operatives who had been waiting for state appointments are now sidelined, as the entry of Raila into the coalition has prompted a reshuffle. Key allies like Mithika Linturi and Aisha Jumwa have seen their influence wane, replaced by Raila’s supporters. This shift is alienating Ruto from his core base, particularly in the Mt Kenya region, which is growing increasingly disillusioned.
As Caesar’s experience teaches us, alliances must be carefully assessed for their long-term viability. If they no longer serve one’s interests, they must be discarded, regardless of the political cost. The mounting discontent, particularly in regions like Kisii, which are joining the anti-Ruto wave—as evidenced by the Shabana jersey launch—could signify the beginning of a larger fracture.
Ruto may ultimately find himself in a position where breaking away from this alliance, much like Caesar did, becomes necessary for his political survival.
From this, it is clear that timing is crucial in forming political alliances. Premature coalitions often create vulnerabilities, limit strategic maneuverability, and provide opponents ample time to devise counter-measures.
A leader must carefully assess not just whom to align with, but also when and how to do so to maximize political leverage. The Ruto-Raila pact, if truly meant to shift Kenya’s political landscape, should have been unveiled closer to the 2027 elections—perhaps within months, not years, of the polls.
Forming such an alliance two years before the election allows rivals to regroup, dilute its impact, and engineer political realignments that could render it ineffective. The excitement generated by such a high-stakes partnership must be sustained and strategically paced to influence voter sentiment at the most critical moment.
If elections were to be held in August 2025, the impact of the Ruto-Raila alliance would have been formidable. However, with 2027 still a long way off, the risk of fatigue, disillusionment, or betrayal looms large. Kenyan politics thrives on momentum— maintaining the enthusiasm of this alliance for the next three years will be a near-impossible task, and by the time the election season peaks, the alliance may have already lost its spark.
